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THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE: USING
NEUROSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS?
Adam B. Shniderman*
INTRODUCTION
Why does one death matter against so many? Because
there is good and there is evil, and evil must be punished. Even in the face of Armageddon I shall not compromise in this. But there are so many deserving of retribution . . . and there is so little time.
Walter Kovacs/Rorschach, WATCHMEN

H

ank Greely writes, “[t]oday we are regularly making new
discoveries about the functioning of the human brain,
discoveries that have led many lawyers, philosophers, and neuroscientists to speculate about the consequences of our new understanding for the criminal justice system.”1 Greely notes that
scholars have focused almost exclusively on questions of responsibility, reaching conclusions “from apocalyptic to ‘business
as usual.’”2 Joshua Greene, a philosopher at Harvard University, leans towards the apocalyptic view. Greene asserts that our
operative “legal principles exist because they more or less adequately capture an intuitive sense(s) of justice.”3 For him, neuroscience will challenge and “reshape our intuitive sense of justice.”4 While he concedes that the “business as usual” scholars,
namely Stephen Morse, are correct that the law currently re* Adam B. Shniderman is a doctoral student in the Department of Criminology, Law and Society at the University of California Irvine. The author has a
B.A. cum laude in Law, Jurisprudence and Social Thought from Amherst
College and an M.A. from the University of California Irvine. I would like to
thank Simon Cole, Bill Thompson and Tony Smith for their extensive comments on earlier drafts and guidance in writing this. I would also like to
thank my family for their support in this endeavor.
1. Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility But Treatment, 56 U. KAN. L REV. 1103, 1103 (2008).
2. Id.
3. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes
Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. B 1775, 1775 (2004).
4. Id.

656

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:2

quires only minimal rationality, Greene contends that new
neuroscientific discoveries will radically change society’s intuitive sense of justice, our collective morality.5 The issues facing
the American criminal justice system are complicated. But
what does the emergence of this science mean for the trials of
the most horrific crimes?
Since the first modern war crimes trial at Nuremberg, there
has been speculation that war criminals’ deviant and aberrant
behavior stemmed from psychopathology.6 In response to Adolf
Eichmann’s seemingly ordinary demeanor during his trial in
Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt famously characterized his behavior as “the banality of evil,” although some disagree with her
assessment.7 Gustave Gilbert, an American Army psychologist
assigned to interview and evaluate the defendants at Nuremberg, characterized the defendants as uniformly lacking empathy, potentially qualifying these defendants as psychopaths. 8
Miale and Selzer also found what they believe supported a
claim of pervasive psychopathology among the Nuremberg defendants.9 They concluded, “[t]he Nazis were not psychologically normal or healthy individuals.”10 Instead, these men consti5. Id. at 1775–76, 1784; see also Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the
Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH 1, 2 (2008); Greely, supra note 1, at 1103.
6. JAMES WALLER, BECOMING EVIL: HOW ORDINARY PEOPLE COMMIT
GENOCIDE AND MASS KILLING 59–62 (2007). Gustave Gilbert, an army psychologist at Nuremberg, wrote several articles developing what he thought
was the explanation for the behavior of high-ranking Nazi officials. In 1963,
Gilbert published The Mentality of SS Murderous Robots, in which he maintained that the Nazis had cultivated a particular personality type that lacked
any sense of empathy or conscience. Others, however, have disagreed. See id.
at 63–70.
7. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM (2006). Most notably, Raul
Hilberg disagreed with her assessment of Eichmann’s evil as “banal” in his
work THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS.
8. The term psychopath is frequently used to describe violent offenders
and people whose motives the public does not understand. In this paper, the
term psychopath is used strictly in a psychological, technical sense, referring
to those individuals who score 30 or greater on the Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R). Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R), available
at http://www.minddisorders.com/Flu-Inv/Hare-Psychopathy-Checklist.html;
ROBERT HARE, MANUAL FOR THE HARE PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST-REVISED
(1991).
9. WALLER, supra note 6, at 67.
10. ERIC ZILLMER, THE QUEST FOR THE NAZI PERSONALITY: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
INVESTIGATION OF NAZI WAR CRIMINALS 94 (1995).
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tuted, from a psychological standpoint, a “highly distinctive
group.”11 The possibility that a war criminal would offer insanity or diminished capacity as a defense is not new. Some were
concerned that three defendants at Nuremberg, most notably
Rudolph Hess, would attempt to plead insanity.12 More recently, Esad Landzo offered an affirmative, psychological defense at
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)
during the “Celebici Camp” trial.13 With the increased use of
neuroscience in courtrooms across the world, supporting claims
that there are biological underpinnings to these psychological
phenomena, comes the possibility that defendants tried at the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) will attempt to mitigate
their culpability or excuse their conduct with support from
brain scans and expert witnesses.
To the extent modern War Crimes trials seek to model themselves after domestic criminal proceedings (i.e., holding an individual responsible for his or her actions through adjudication
of guilt followed by punitive sanctions), the use of evidence
demonstrating neurologic pathologies associated with deviant
behavior may hinder the court’s ability to find offenders culpable. In fact, several key aspects of the international criminal
justice system face challenges from this emerging science.
What do neuroscientific discoveries about deviance, particularly violence, mean for the didactic value of trials, for justice, and
the form of response we choose to implement in the wake of
11. Id. at 177–78.
12. Prior to trial, doctors from each delegation, the United States, the
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France, evaluated Hess’ mental condition. They concluded that Hess was not insane in the strict sense of the
word– he was aware of what was going on around him. However, they did
suggest that he could be impaired in his ability to assist in his own defense.
Given the evaluations, Hess proceeded to trial without offering an insanity
defense. See Report of Commission to Examine Defendant Hess (Nov. 17,
1945), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/v1-28.asp.
13. Esad Landzo was purported to be a guard at the detention facility in
Celebici, Bosnia between May and December 1992. He was indicted and detained at the ICTY in 1996. Landzo was charged with 24 counts of criminal
conduct, including multiple counts of murder, torture, and rape. Landzo’s
mental state was a significant issue at trial. Several psychiatrists evaluated
the defendant and testified about his mental state. The court ultimately rejected his claim that he was not responsible for his actions due to psychological disorders. Landzo was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years in prison
and was released in 2006. See infra notes 137–141 and accompanying text for
further discussion.
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atrocity? Certainly, the ICC and other international criminal
tribunals could look to the domestic courts of various nations
for guidance on how to address these questions. Ultimately, the
substantial differences between ordinary domestic trials and
extraordinary perpetrator trials suggests that the path taken
in various domestic contexts to incorporating neuroscience and
addressing the particular challenges and issues it poses, is likely to provide little guidance for international criminal tribunals.
This Article explores the difficult questions and choices the
ICC and other international criminal tribunals will face from
evolving scientific discoveries. First, this Article traces the development of international criminal law, and its adjudication
through various international criminal courts. Second, it considers the specific scientific developments relevant to the issue
of adjudicating culpability. Third, the Article discusses the implications for international criminal trials of having to address
a neuroscience-based understanding of culpability, specifically
discussing the implications for the due process rights of the accused, the rights and needs of the victims, the didactic value of
trials, and the viability of the trial model in light of evolving
issues at the intersection of law, politics, and neuroscience.
This analysis will show that whether the international criminal
legal regime accepts or rejects this science, the legitimacy and
justness in a traditional trial model is zero-sum. That is, the
rights of either the accused or victim will be undermined; we
must decide whose. Yet, this realization does not prove fatal for
trials before the ICC. Finally, this Article makes suggestions
for future research and also considers alternative justifications
for punishing offenders at international criminal trials so as to
allow the continuation of a tradition of holding individuals,
particularly heads of state, accountable for their conduct.
I. PRELUDE TO THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIAL
The concept that certain conduct is unacceptable or unlawful
even in times of war can be traced as far back as the sixth century BCE.14 Chinese military general and philosopher Sun Tzu
wrote that punitive and excessive measures against an enemy

14. SUN TZU, ART OF WAR (Stephen F. Kaufman ed., Stephen F. Kaufman
trans., 1996).
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were inexcusable.15 He argued that these measures were unacceptable because they were ineffective and inefficient. Sun
Tzu’s writings shaped the law of war and international law going forward.16 There are a few historical examples of holding
individuals accountable for violating the laws of war long before anyone even contemplated the trials at Nuremberg. 17
However, these incidents did not take place in a nominal court
of law and they were not true trials, so much as occasions for
pronouncing unilateral, predetermined findings of guilt and
summary execution.18 Each of these “trials” occurred in a time
in which Cicero’s pronouncement that “law is silent amidst the
clash of arms,” reigned.19
The precedent for holding recognized heads of state individually responsible in a court of law traces back to the trial of King
Charles I in 1649. This trial marked the first prosecution of a
civilian or military head of state in a court of law for crimes
committed during conflict.20 At the time, holding a recognized
head of state responsible for conduct during wartime was a

15. Timothy L.H. McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes
and the Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 684
n.4 (1997).
16. Id. at 684.
17. See Jordan J. Paust, ILSA Panel Oct. 18, 2003, at Loyola University
New Orleans-Panel on History of International Tribunals Prior to Nuremberg: Selective History of International Tribunals and Efforts Prior to Nuremberg, 10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 207, 207–8 (2003). For a discussion of
individuals tried before tribunals convened prior to Nuremberg, see M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND
CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 86–156 (2011).
18. For example, the English tried and executed William Wallace for treason and atrocities against civilians in 1305 CE. The ad hoc trial afforded Wallace no legal rights or privileges. They marched Wallace through the city to
the place of his eventual execution, the indictment was read and sentence
was pronounced and carried out without any opportunity for defense.
MAGNÚS MAGNÚSSON, SCOTLAND: THE STORY OF A NATION 155 (2000).
19. While this is an oversimplification—in that, as noted, there had been
an understanding that there were rules governing the conduct of war long
before any of these trials—I wish to convey that at the time of these trials, it
was not a routine practice to hold perpetrators responsible for conduct during
wartime. Political pressures and pragmatism greatly overshadowed any expectation of individual accountability.
20. CHARLES ANTHONY SMITH, THE RISE AND FALL OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS:
FROM CHARLES I TO BUSH II 29 (2012).

660

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:2

novel concept.21 The trial arose following the conclusion of the
English Civil War for the supposed purpose of redressing the
wrongs committed by Charles I against both civilians and the
prevailing military. 22 Charles I was charged with murdering
civilians, torture, involuntary conscription, and high treason.23
However, the substantive and procedural flaws of this “trial”
demonstrate it was little more than a farce, constituted to serve
the political agenda of the prevailing army, led by Oliver
Cromwell.24 Substantively, the tribunal was created and convened to try a single individual from the entire conflict and the
substance of the indictment was stretched to assure that the
charges would stand against Charles I. 25 The procedural aspects were little better. Charles I had no right to appeal, pardon, or reconsideration26 and he faced his accusers without a
number of additional procedural rights: the right to counsel,
the ability to present a defense or challenge the prosecution’s
evidence, the right to cross-examine any witnesses, and the
ability to appeal any judicial decision.27 Charles I steadfastly
protested his trial, asserting that because of the significant legal shortcomings the court lacked the legitimacy to try him.28
However, to acknowledge any of the king’s assertions would
mean the court lacked the legal right to proceed. As such, the
court summarily dismissed and disregarded his claims. Because Charles I refused to cooperate with the orchestrators of
21. Id. at 103. Smith suggests that prior to Nuremberg, holding an individual responsible for his or her conduct during war was a novel concept.
22. Id. at 36.
23. Id.
24. “The appeal to the rule of law as a justification for their actions was a
mechanism used by Cromwell and his faction simply to facilitate the implementation of the style of government that they desired.” Id. at 35. Conducting
a trial to convict Charles I prior to executing him, instead of summarily executing him without even the façade of legal process as had happened in the
past to tyrants, would not convey the same message. The trial signified a
shift in the style of governance, in which those who made the laws would be
bound by them, rather than above the law as had been the case with the
monarchy. As Smith writes, “[t]he premise of how this approach would help
consolidate power was straightforward. Specifically, if even the monarch was
subject to the dictates of the law, then the law would be supreme over everyone.” Id.
25. Id. at 39.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 43.
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the trial and embrace an apparently predetermined fate, the
court treated the king’s non-response as an admission of guilt
and convicted him of the crimes charged in the indictment.29
While civilian and military leaders were held responsible in
various formal trials following the trial of Charles I, the concept that heads of state and military leaders should be tried in
criminal courts for crimes committed at their behest did not
become widely accepted or routine until the twentieth century.30 Prior to Nuremberg, the idea that individual perpetrators
would and could be held accountable for their conduct was
quite radical. 31 The combination between the increasing frequency of states punishing violations of the laws of war and the
agreements reached at the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899
and 1907 for the first multilateral conventions regulating the
conduct of war resulted in a growing recognition and acceptance of individual culpability for violations of the international laws of war.32
II. THE MODERN TRIAL PARADIGM
The turn of the twentieth century marked the beginning of a
concerted effort to design a framework for holding leaders individually responsible for acts occurring during war. From the
outset of World War I, Allied states called for the trial of Central Power individuals engaged in perpetrating atrocities.33 The
Allied governments established a Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, charged with investigating who was responsible for
breaches of the laws of war, and with drafting proposals for the
establishment of a “High Tribunal” to try these offenders.34 Despite the participants’ strong sentiment for holding perpetrators accountable and the dedication and careful work that went
29. Id. at 44.
30. Lawrence Douglas, The Didactic Trial: Filtering History and Memory
into the Courtroom, 14 EURO. REV. 513, 513 (2006).
31. Id.
32. TIMOTHY L.H. MCCORMACK & GERRY J. SIMPSON, THE LAW OF WAR
CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 43 (1997). These initial
and subsequent agreements developed at The Hague created a unified, international set of “laws of war” for States to follow. Prior to these agreements,
the laws of war varied from State to State.
33. McCormack, supra note 15, at 698.
34. MCCORMACK & SIMPSON, supra note 32, at 45–46.
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into formulating the tribunal at the Peace Conference, it never
conducted any trials.35 This work, however paved the way for
what has become the cornerstone of the international criminal
trial, the International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) at Nuremburg.36
Following the conclusion of World War II, leaders across the
world demanded the Nazi perpetrators face justice for their
crimes. 37 The Allied nations could not afford to ignore these
calls to hold responsible the perpetrators of some of the worst
crimes humanity had ever seen.38 Initially, the Soviets suggested that de-Nazification could proceed quickly by implementing
large-scale execution.39 Many Americans supported the calls for
summary execution of the Nazi Generals.40 In spite of strong
early support, however, the Allies rejected the proposal.41 Instead, Allied leaders decided to hold these individuals to account through a “fair process” that “furthered the ends of justice, retribution, and deterrence.”42 The Allies adopted the London Charter of the IMT in August of 1945, which set forth the
jurisdiction of the tribunal for several categories of crimes, a
few of which many now consider the “core crimes” of international law. 43 While the establishing document delegated the
35. McCormack, supra note 15, at 702; see also, MCCORMACK & SIMPSON,
supra note 32, at 47.
36. McCormack, supra note 15, at 714.
37. The United Nations War Crimes Commission was established in October 1942 to draw up lists of criminals to be tried. The commission was composed of representatives from fifteen different nations, including the United
States and Great Britain. EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF THE GERMANS: AN
ACCOUNT OF THE TWENTY-TWO DEFENDANTS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL AT NUREMBERG 5 (1966).
38. McCormack, supra note 15, at 714–15.
39. SMITH, supra note 20, at 85.
40. DONALD M. MCKALE, NAZIS AFTER HITLER: HOW PERPETRATORS OF THE
HOLOCAUST CHEATED JUSTICE AND TRUTH 6 (2012).
41. SMITH, supra note 20, at 85.
42. Id. at 86.
43. Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INTL. LAW 551, 564 (2006); Charter of the International Military Tribunal [London Charter] sec. 1, art. 1, sec. 2, art. 6.
The London Charter gave the IMT jurisdiction over Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Peace. Contrary to popular belief, it did
not give the court jurisdiction over the Nazi genocide of the Jewish people.
Genocide was not formally defined as a crime until the 1948 United Nations
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
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determination of specific procedures to the tribunal, the call for
a “Fair Trial for Defendants” demonstrates that the authors
contemplated just, fair, and unobjectionable process that would
deter future leaders and provide retribution for those seriously
aggrieved by the Nazi’s actions.44 This is not to suggest that the
Tribunal is without criticism or problems. Scholars routinely
point out the jurisdictional problems and the use of ex post facto laws to criminalize the Nazi’s conduct.45
The decision to prosecute the Nazi leaders at Nuremburg
marked the beginning of the war crimes tribunal as an institutionalized and expected response to atrocity. 46 Significant
thought and care went into establishing the IMT to assure respect for the substantive and procedural rights of the accused.
While the IMT became the standard against which subsequent
war crimes tribunals are frequently measured, it is not the only
criminal trial to influence modern international criminal trials.47 In fact, the form of the modern trials is more similar to
the Eichmann trial.48 For example, the prosecution at the IMT
relied heavily on the Nazi’s own documentation of their criminal conduct, using documentary video footage and extensive
written materials. 49 The victim-witness (or survivor-witness)
was of significantly less focus than these other forms of evidence.50 However, at the Eichmann trial, the prosecution chose
Since then, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, and Genocide have come
to be considered the core crimes of international law. JANN KLEFFNER,
COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND NATIONAL CRIMINAL
JURISDICTIONS 1 (2008).
44. London Charter sec. 4, art. 16.
45. Jonathan Friedman, Law and Politics in the Subsequent Nuremberg
Trials: 1946-1949, in ATROCITIES ON TRIAL: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
POLITICS OF PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES 75, 81 (Patricia Heberer & Jürgen
Matthäus eds., 2008).
46. SMITH, supra note 20, at 23.
47. Id. at 22, 80.
48. Lawrence Douglas, The 50th Anniversary of the Eichmann Trial – A
(June
13,
2011),
Look
Back,
YOUTUBE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lYpvBG4ELSw. According to Lawrence
Douglas’s address at New York University’s colloquium on the fiftieth anniversary of the Eichmann trial, the contemporary paradigm of international
criminal law, what he calls the “jurisprudence of atrocity,” bears greater similarity to the Eichmann trial than the Nuremberg trial.
49. Douglas, supra note 30, at 515.
50. Id. Justice Jackson of the IMT “tactically limited the use of ‘soft evidence’—eyewitness testimony—in favor of ‘hard evidence’ – trial by docu-
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to proceed in a different manner, and the victim-witness played
a significant role in the trial.51 Subsequent trials have had varying degrees of success in incorporating victims into the process, with the ad hoc ICTY relying heavily on the victimwitness.52 The ICC has also gone to great effort to assure the
victim-witness a place in the trial.53 While several paradigms
exist to provide justice in the wake of atrocity, including truth
commissions like those used in South Africa and various South
American countries, 54 the trial paradigm is seen today as a
fundamental requirement of doing justice in the wake of atrocity.55
III. THE MEDICAL MODEL OF BEHAVIOR AND DEVIANCE
Nikolas Rose writes, “[w]e live inescapably in a biologized
culture. Not merely the sickness of human beings, but also
their personalities, passions and the forces that mobilize
them—their identities themselves appear at least potentially to
be explicable in biological terms, and increasingly in terms of
their genetic makeup.” 56 Rose’s assessment is quite apt. The
process of medicalization allows one to probe conduct once
thought to be a normal part of life for possible physiological origins and place it in the realm of illness and disorder.57 Once
thusly categorized, one can fix or improve that conduct, as is
frequently done with pharmaceutical intervention.58 The psy-

ment. This approach assumed a broad and imaginative range of forms, including an unprecedented use of documentary film in a juridical setting.” Id.
51. Id.
52. Patricia M. Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an
International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y. 87, 107 (2001).
53. Article 68 of the Rome Statute of the ICC is dedicated to the “protection of the victims and witnesses and their participation in the proceedings.”
This section carefully outlines the opportunities for participation of the victim-witness in the proceedings. Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court [Rome Statute], July 17, 1998, art. 68, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998).
54. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
55. Douglas, supra note 30, at 513.
56. Nikolas Rose, The Biology of Culpability: Pathological Identity and
Crime Control in a Biological Culture, 4 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 5, 6
(2000).
57. Peter Conrad and Valerie Leiter, Medicalization, Markets and Consumers, 45 J. HEALTH AND SOC. BEHAV. 158, 158–59 (2004).
58. Id.
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chiatric community has been responsible for transforming a
number of behaviors into medical conditions. One of the most
prominent examples of the modern era is the medicalization of
unhappiness. Incorporated in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”) in 1980, major depressive
disorder (depression), became an officially diagnosable condition, treatable with a class of prescription drugs known as Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (“SSRIs”). 59 Americans
and Europeans alike have embraced this phenomenon with
great fervor, particularly with respect to depression. A recent
report shows that doctors have prescribed antidepressants to
one in ten Americans, with comparable figures in Europe.60 Peter Conrad and Joseph W. Schneider suggest that the public
has become increasingly dissatisfied with the mild and benign
symptoms of daily life. However, the fervor for “medicalizing”
extends beyond every day illnesses and disorders, partly because moving behavior into the realm of the medical can depoliticize and remove moral judgment.61
Biological and “pathological” explanations for criminal conduct appear as far back as the Fourth Century. In his Prior
Analytics, Aristotle writes,
It is possible to infer character from features, if it is granted
that the body and the soul are changed together by the natural affections: I say ‘natural,’ for though perhaps by learning
music a man has made some change in his soul, this is not
one of those affections natural to us; rather I refer to passions
and desires when I speak of natural emotions. If then this
were granted and also that for each change there is a corresponding sign, and we could state the affection and sign prop-

59. Petra Zimmermann et al., Heterogeneity of DSM-IV Major Depressive
Disorder as a Consequence of Subthreshold Bipolarity, 66 ARCH. GEN PSYCH.
1341, 1341 (2009).
60. Courtney Hutchison, One in 10 Americans Use Antidepressants, Most
OCT.
19,
2011,
Don’t
See
a
Therapist,
ABC
NEWS,
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Wellness/10-americans-antidepressantstherapist/story?id=14763251#.T5SLxFH54WE (last visited Jan 2, 2013); see
also, University of Warwick, Ten Percent of Middle-Aged Europeans Are on
Antidepressants, Study Suggests, SCI. DAILY (June 20, 2011),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/06/110620094435.htm.
61. PETER CONRAD & JOSEPH W. SCHNEIDER, DEVIANCE AND
MEDICALIZATION: FROM BADNESS TO SICKNESS 250 (1980).
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er to each kind of animal, we shall be able to infer character
from features.62

Generally, Aristotle contended that individuals who had facial
features resembling animals often had temperaments like
those animals.63 As the emerging field of science shed light on
new physical phenomena, biological theories of criminality
evolved.
The early “scientific” theories of deviance took a deterministic
view of criminality, frequently asserting the deviant was born
with the character trait.64 In the nineteenth century, phrenology, the measurement and study of an individual’s skull to assess personality, added systematicity to the notion of the innate criminal.65 Much like physiognomy, the study of an individual’s personality from his or her appearance, phrenology relied on the assumption that outer appearances reflected inner
states. 66 Spurzheim, a noted phrenologist, wrote that “there
must be an organ of the brain that determines the propensity
to kill, and . . . function[s] independently of other propensities.”67 He noted protuberances in the skulls of several killers,
which he attributed to an overdevelopment of particular regions of the brain.68 Along with his colleague Gall, Spurzheim
identified thirty-five characteristics of the head that corresponded with particular personality types.69 Like most biological explanations, phrenologists based their explanations on a
deterministic approach to human behavior. Criminality was
not the result of free will gone awry, but rather “abnormal
brain organization.” 70 Other nineteenth century theorists not
engaged in phrenology also took a deterministic view of deviance. Dr. George Savage wrote that “moral insanity” is innate,

62. ARISTOTLE, PRIOR ANALYTICS 100 (A.J. Jenkinson and G.R.G. Mure
trans., 2006).
63. CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra note 61, at 217.
64. Id. at 262.
65. NICOLE HAHN RAFTER, THE CRIMINAL BRAIN: UNDERSTANDING
BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF CRIME 40 (2008).
66. Id. at 44.
67. Id. at 49.
68. Id. at 49–50.
69. CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra note 61, at 217.
70. RAFTER, supra note 65, at 50.
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inherited from “unsound parents” or a result of conception
while the “parents were feverish or syphilitic.”71
Cesare Lombroso, the father of modern criminology, wrote
that the criminal is vain, bloodthirsty, remorseless, and undeterrable.72 In his work Criminal Man, Lombroso asserts a theory of atavism, the tendency to revert to earlier forms, suggesting that criminals are biological “throwbacks,” who have reverted to an earlier, primitive, subhuman being, with multiple
physical anomalies that separated them from the average person.73 He writes, “[t]he most horrendous and inhuman crimes
have a biological, atavistic origin in those animalistic instincts
that . . . resurface instantly under given circumstances.”74
The concept of heredity played a key role in early twentieth
century biological theories. For example, Johannes Lange published Crime as Destiny in 1929, which detailed the findings of
his study of twins assessing the inheritance of crime.75 Lange
studied thirty pairs of twins, at least one of whom was in prison. The study contained thirteen pairs of identical twins and
seventeen pairs of fraternal twins.76 Lange hypothesized that if
identical twins were found in prison together more often than
fraternal twins were, this finding would indicate the heritability of criminality. 77 Lange’s study confirmed his heredity hypothesis. Of the thirteen identical twin sets, Lange found ten
cases in which both were in prison together, whereas only two
sets of the seventeen sets of fraternal twins were in prison together.78 Thus, Lange concluded, “as far as crime is concerned,
monozygotic [identical] twins on the whole react in a definitely
similar manner, dizygotic [fraternal] twins behave quite different . . . innate tendencies play a preponderant part [in the
causes of crime].” 79 In the wake of the Nazi eugenics of the

71. Id. at 34.
72. CESARE LOMBROSO, CRIMINAL MAN 40, 91 (Mary Gibson & Nicole Hahn
Rafter trans., 2006).
73. Id. at 1, 91.
74. RAFTER, supra note 65, at 74.
75. JOHANNES LANGE, CRIME AS DESTINY: A STUDY OF CRIMINAL TWINS
(1929).
76. CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra note 61, at 219.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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1930s and 1940s, biological theories fell out of favor with criminologists.80
However, the latter part of the twentieth century saw a resurgence in biological theories of crime, beginning with Crime
and Personality, in which Hans Eysenck “revived the medical
model by explaining criminality in genetic and neurophysiological terms.”81 In 1985, Wilson and Herrnstein published Crime
and Human Nature, another major work in the revival of biological theories of crime. Wilson and Herrnstein argue that individuals differ at birth in the degree to which they are at risk
for criminality.82 Working through the various biological theories offered throughout history, Wilson and Herrnstein conclude, “[t]he evidence leaves no doubt that constitutional traits
correlate with criminal behavior.” 83 Although critics believe
Wilson and Herrnstein engaged in “bad social science” and that
their evidence leaves significant doubt, Human Nature began
the resurgence of interest in biological theories of crime.84
As scholars from various disciplines sought to understand the
general heritability of deviant behavior, they also searched for
the specific genetic sources of these behaviors.85 However, unlike previous biological theorists, many of today’s behavioral
scientists are not determinists. Studies on a variety of genes,
particularly genes related to the formation and processing of
neurotransmitters (chemicals in the brain that transmit signals from a neuron to a cell across a synapse), have yielded results that suggest a genetic component to deviant, particularly
aggressive, behavior.86 For example, a particular recessive genotype of the tryptophan hydroxylase-1 (“TPH1”) gene, involved
in the synthesis of the neurotransmitter serotonin, has been
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

RAFTER, supra note 65, at 199.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 173.
RICHARD A. BALL, ET AL., CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: CONTEXT AND
CONSEQUENCES 307–11 (2011).
85. See, e.g., Kent Nilsson et al., Role of Monoamine Oxidase A Genotype
and Psychosocial Factors in Male Adolescent Criminal Activity, 59 BIO.
PSYCH. 121, 121 (2006); Nelly Alia-Klein et al., Brain Monoamine Oxidase A
Activity Predicts Trait Aggression, 28 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5099, 5099 (2008);
Joshua W. Buckholtz & Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg, MAOA and the Neurogenetic Architecture of Human Aggression, 31 TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCES 120,
120 (2008).
86. Id.
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found to be a genetic risk factor for criminal behavior, particularly homicidal behavior in patients with schizophrenia.87 The
MAO-A gene, also known as the “warrior gene,” which codes an
enzyme responsible for degrading the neurotransmitters noradrenaline, adrenaline, serotonin, and dopamine, has also been
a significant target of research.88 Studies have revealed that a
particular low activity form of the gene, in conjunction with environmental factors, could lead to aggressive impulsiveness.89
While genetic research continues, particularly in an effort to
understand gene-by-environment interactions, 90 advances in
structural and functional imaging technology have led researchers to focus on the brain as the source of understanding
criminal behavior.
“Neurocriminologists” are conducting research to understand
deviant behavior in what many in the field claim is the final
frontier—the origin of all behavior—the brain. 91 Like those
studying gene-by-environment interactions, neurocriminologists recognize an interaction between an individual’s biology
and his or her environment. Particularly popular, at present, is
research on the neurological correlates of antisocial personality
(psychopathy) and violent behavior, paying significant atten-

87. Kyung Bong Koh et al., The Relation of Serotonin-Related Gene and
COMT Gene Polymorphisms with Criminal Behavior in Schizophrenic Disorder, 73 J CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 159 (2012).
88. See, e.g., Nilsson et al., supra note 85, at 121; Alia-Klein et al., supra
note 85, at 5099; Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, supra note 85, at 120;
Roope Tikkanen et al., Effects of MAO-A Genotype, Alcohol Consumption, and
Aging on Violent Behavior, 33 ALCOHOL CLIN. EX. RES. 428 (2009).
89. Klaus A. Miczek & Eric W. Fish, Monoamines, GABA, Glutamate, and
Aggression, in BIOLOGY OF AGGRESSION 114, 126 (Randy J. Nelson ed., 2005).
90. Gene-by-environment interaction is the name for the interaction between an individual’s genetic makeup and his surrounding environment. This
theory suggests that while a gene may be present, environmental conditions
affect the phenotypic presentation of that gene. Gene-Environment Interaction, THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH SCIENCES,
http://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/topics/science/gene-env/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
91. Admittedly, the claims that scientists are investigating the origins of
behavior and are examining “the final frontier” are reminiscent of claims that
have been made by scientists in the past. As scientists have pushed the limits
of existing technology throughout history, they have claimed to be looking at
the “source” of behavior.
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tion, as Greely notes, to re-conceptualizing the criminal law’s
understanding of the culpable criminal.92
Imaging studies have paid attention to a variety of regions of
the brain. Scholars have explored the role of the prefrontal cortex—the region of the brain just behind the forehead that is
implicated in decision-making and regulating behavior—in antisocial and violent behavior since the early nineteenth century. The case of Phineas Gage provided perhaps the first look
into the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in antisocial behavior. Gage, a railroad worker, was injured when an iron
spike went through his head, resulting in extensive damage to
his prefrontal cortex. Following the incident, Gage, the normally courteous and hard-working individual, became antisocial.93
Since the Gage case, empirical studies have shown that patients with antisocial personality disorder (“APD”) have an 11%
reduction in prefrontal cortex gray matter, with similar findings in studies of aggressive individuals and pathological liars.94 Functional imaging studies have also revealed decreased
activation in this region of the brain in impulsive violent individuals, suggesting impulsive violence stems from diminished
use of the prefrontal cortex’s inhibition systems.95 In addition
to the prefrontal cortex, a variety of areas of the limbic system
show structural and functional differences in individuals with
antisocial behavior.96

92. Greely, supra note 1, at 1103–04.
93. Michael Freeman, Law and the Brain, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, 13
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 5, 4–5 (2011).
94. Adrian Raine et al., Reduced Prefrontal Gray Matter Volume and Reduced Autonomic Activity in Antisocial Personality Disorder, 57 ARCH. GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 119, 119, 123 (2000).
95. Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PLOS
BIOLOGY 693, 693–94 (2007).
96. See, e.g., Kent A. Kiehl, A Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective on Psychopathy: Evidence for Paralymbic Dysfunction, 142 PSYCHIATRY RES. 107
(2006); Kent A. Kiehl et al., Limbic Abnormalities in Affective Processing by
Criminal Psychopaths as Revealed by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 50 BIO. PSYCH. 677 (2001); Jari Tiihonen et al., Amygdaloid Volume Loss
in Psychopathy, SOCIETY FOR NEUROSCIENCE ABSTRACTS 2017 (2000); Elsa Ermer et al., Aberrant Paralimbic Gray Matter in Criminal Psychopathy, 121 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCH 649 (2012). The limbic system is a set of structures, including the hippocampus, the hypothalamus, the amygdala and several surrounding areas that regulate a variety of functions, primarily emotion (particularly
relevant for antisocial behavior is the role in fear conditioning).
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The amygdala has become perhaps the most prominent area
of the limbic system investigated in research on individuals
with theory of mind deficit (Autism Spectrum Disorders), aggression, and the inability to interpret sadness and fear in faces. The focus on this region is due in part because of its role in
emotional processing.97 As Simon Baron-Cohen notes, each of
these disorders can be characterized by a lack of empathy.98
Particular focus has been paid to this region of the brain in
psychopathic criminals in an effort to understand their poor
fear conditioning and lack of empathy. According to functional
magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”) studies, psychopathic offenders have decreased activation in the amygdala in response
to shocking and fearful stimuli.99
Adrian Raine, a neuroscientist at the University of Pennsylvania, has discovered the first neurodevelopmental marker for
antisocial personality and psychopathy.100 In a study of eightyseven individuals, Raine and his colleagues examined the presence of Cavum Septum Pellucidum (“CSP”), a septum pellucidum with separation between its two component parts, to test a
neurodevelopmental hypothesis of antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy.101 Their study found evidence that those
with CSP had significantly “higher levels of antisocial personality, psychopathy, criminal charges and convictions” compared
with control subjects, supporting the conclusion that there is a
neurodevelopmental basis to a broad spectrum of antisocial behaviors.102

97. Id.
98. SIMON BARON-COHEN, THE SCIENCE OF EVIL (2011).
99. Niels Birbaumer et al., Deficient Fear Condition in Psychopathy: A
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study, 62 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY
799, 803 (2005).
100. Adrian Raine et al., Neurodevelopmental Marker for Limbic Maldevelopment in Antisocial Personality Disorder and Psychopathy, 197 BR. J.
PSYCHIATRY 186, 186 (2010).
101. Id. According to Raine, “Cavum Septum Pellucidum is a marker for
fetal neural maldevelopment.” During fetal development, a space forms between the two laminae-forming the CSP. The closure of the CSP begins at
approximately the twentieth week of gestation and ends between three and
six months after birth. In this study, Raine is comparing individuals whose
CSP failed to fuse with those whose CSP developed normally. Id.
102. Id. at 190.
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IV. NEUROSCIENCE IN COURTROOMS TODAY
Neuroscientific evidence addressing a variety of legal issues
has begun to appear in courtrooms across the globe. In most
instances, the evidence has been offered to address individual
or group culpability.103 In the United States, the most prominent uses of neuroscientific evidence have been to establish
diminished culpability. In three decisions since 2005, the Supreme Court addressed the use of neuroscientific evidence
within the framework of punishment of adolescent criminals:
Roper v. Simmons,104 Graham v. Florida,105 and Miller v. Alabama. 106 In Roper, several amicus briefs cited neuroscientific
studies to argue that imposing the death penalty on adolescents under age eighteen is cruel and unusual punishment.107
The science was used to demonstrate that adolescents’ brains
are not fully developed, particularly their frontal lobes, supporting the assertion that adolescents’ self-control is diminished.108 The Court eventually found the death penalty unconstitutional for minors, based on “objective indicia” that there
was a national consensus opposing the imposition of the death
penalty on individuals under eighteen.109 However, the Roper
court did not clearly define the extent of its reliance on the
neuroscientific evidence. Five years later, the Court considered
the constitutionality of sentencing minors to life in prison
without the possibility of parole for non-capital crimes in Gra-

103. For example, neuroscience has been used to support the proposition
that juveniles, as a class of offenders, are less culpable than adult offenders,
and therefore should not be executed or imprisoned for life without the possibility of parole. In other instances, expert witnesses, Adrian Raine and Kent
Kiehl, have testified in the sentencing phase of trials that a particular individual suffered from neurologic abnormalities that should mitigate the punishment meted out by the court. See the cases of Donta Page and Brian
Dugan, respectively.
104. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555–56, 559 (2005).
105. Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2054–55 (2010).
106. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
107. See, e.g., Brief for the American Psychological Association, and the
Missouri Psychological Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 4, Roper v. Simmons, 542 U.S. 551 (2005), (No. 03-633); Brief for the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3,
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
108. Brief for the American Medical Association at 20, Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005)(No. 03-633).
109. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567, 572–73 (2005).
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ham. As in Roper, medical and psychological groups submitted
amicus briefs addressing issues related to the development of
the adolescent brain.110 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Graham, clearly indicated the influence neuroscience had
on the decision, as had not been the case in Roper.111 He wrote,
No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles. As petitioner’s amici point out, developments in psychology and brain
science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late
adolescence.112

Most recently, in Miller, the Supreme Court ruled that mandatory life without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide
crimes violates the Eighth Amendment. 113 In this case, the
Court recognizes that the science presented to the Court justifying its decisions in Roper and Graham has become even
stronger, requiring individually tailored sentencing that takes
into account the particular characteristics of the youth offender.114 During this same period of time, neuroscientific evidence
and expert testimony based on fMRI scans have been offered
during both the trial and the sentencing phases in two cases to
mitigate culpability for specific adult offenders in murder cases
in the United States.
110. See Brief for the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Neither Party, Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 087412, 08-7621); Brief for the American Psychological Association et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011
(2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621).
111. Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2054–55 (2010). While amicus
briefs were filed in Roper, the opinion of the Court never explicitly cited neuroscientific evidence. Lizzie Buchen, Science in Court: Arrested Development,
484 NATURE 304, 306 (Apr. 18, 2012).
112. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2026.
113. This decision, unlike Roper and Graham “does not categorically bar a
penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime . . . . Instead, it mandates only
that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth
and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” Miller
v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012). Thus, sentencers may continue to
impose life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide
crimes; however, the sentence must have the option not to impose such a sentence.
114. Id. at 2464 n.5.
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In an Illinois criminal proceeding, Kent Kiehl, a professor of
psychology at the University of New Mexico, scanned the brain
of convicted murderer Brian Dugan.115 Dugan, who was already
serving two life sentences, faced the death penalty for another
murder. Kiehl scanned Dugan’s brain using a series of cognitive control, attention, and moral-decision making tests, and
conducted a psychological interview on Dugan.116 Dr. Kiehl determined Dugan scored a 38 on the Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised (“PCL-R”), a diagnostic test developed by Robert
Hare of the University of British Columbia.117 The PCL-R is a
clinical assessment for psychopathy, and Dugan’s score of 38
qualified him as a “psychopath.”118 According to the functional
MRI scans, several areas of Dugan’s brain showed deficiencies
common for psychopaths.119 Kiehl testified about his findings at
Dugan’s trial. 120 Ultimately, the jury sentenced Dugan to
death.121 With Governor George Ryan’s bill ending the use of
the death penalty in Illinois, Dugan’s sentence has been commuted to life without parole.
In Colorado, Adrian Raine testified similarly at Donta Page’s
murder trial, citing deficiencies in particular regions of Page’s
brain in support of a lesser sentence. 122 Ultimately, a threejudge panel, sentencing Page to life without parole, determined
that the nature of Page’s crime did not rise to the level of warranting the death penalty, particularly in light of his upbringing.123
Abroad, an Italian court admitted neuroscientific evidence to
demonstrate the defendant’s inability to distinguish between

115. Matthew Taylor, Psychopaths: Born Evil or With A Diseased Brain?,
BBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-15386740.
116. Virginia Hughes, Science in Court: Head Case, 464 NATURE 340, 340
(2010).
117. Id. at 341.
118. Id. According to Kiehl’s assessment, Dugan scored a 38 out of a possible 40, putting him at the extreme end of the psychopathy continuum.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 342.
122. Howard Pankratz, Witness: Page Brain-Damaged, DENVER POST, Nov.
10, 2000.
123. Howard Pankratz, Tuthill Killer Spared Death Penalty, DENVER POST
(Mar. 3, 2001), http://extras.denverpost.com/news/news0303b.htm.
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right and wrong.124 In that case, Stefania Albertani murdered
her sister, burned the corpse, and attempted to kill her parents. 125 Albertani pled guilty to the charges in 2009. Using
EEG and Voxel Based Morphometry (“VBM”), scientists found
a lack of integrity and function in the anterior cingulate cortex,
which controls aggressiveness and compulsivity.126 This finding
coupled with the presence of the MAOA-uVNTR was said to
explain, at least in part, Albertani’s propensity to act aggressively and compulsively.127 The judge espoused the virtues of
neuroscience to complement traditional psychiatric behavioral
assessments to define precise pathologies and evaluate individual abilities to distinguish between right and wrong.128 As a
result of the neuroscientific evidence, Albertani’s sentence was
reduced to twenty years.129 In addition to culpability, neuroscientific evidence has been offered for assessing truthfulness of a
witness.130 With the permeation of neuroscientific evidence in
courtrooms across the globe, the ICC is likely to face decisions
regarding the admissibility and value of neuroscientific evi124. Fabio Turone, Medical Tests Help Reduce Sentence of Woman Accused
of Murder, 343 BMJ (2011).
125. Hank Greely, Another ‘Brain Mitigation’ Criminal Sentence from Italy,
AND
BIOSCIENCES
BLOG
(Sept.
3,
2011),
LAW
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/2011/09/03/another-brainmitigation-criminal-sentence-from-italy/.
126. Barbara Bottalico, The Albertani Case in Italy, NEUROETHICS AND LAW
BLOG
(Sept.
5,
2011,
10:53
AM),
http://kolber.typepad.com/ethics_law_blog/2011/09/the-albertani-case-in-italybottalico.html.
127. Id.
128. Turone, supra note 99, at 343.
129. Id.
130. Neuroscientific lie detection has been excluded in the only two efforts
to admit it in U.S. courts at the time of this writing, in United States v.
Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir. 2012) and Wilson v. Corestaff Services
L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641–42 (2010). However, courts in other parts of the
world have been less resistant to its use. Brain-based lie detection has found
great success in India, particularly in the state of Maharashtra. The technology was used to support dozens of convictions, including one murder case. In
that case, the prosecution used Brain Electrical Oscillations Signature
(“BEOS”) test to demonstrate that the defendant had experiential knowledge
of poisoning her former fiancé. For a discussion of India’s use of neuroscientific evidence, see Anand Giridharads, India’s Use of Brain Scans in Courts
Dismays Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A10, and Teneille Brown &
Emily R. Murphy, Through A Scanner Darkly: The Use of fMRI as Evidence
of Mens Rea, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 319, 336–37 (2008).
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dence in the future. How this information affects the administration of justice is a crucial issue.
V. DOING JUSTICE IN THE FACE OF “THE SCIENCE OF EVIL”
What my love and anger propels me to do is not what our
government should do. Our government should help heal
my pain, but also find ways to punish that do more than
exact the most primitive kind of bloodlust and vengeance. The government should help heal our pain, but not
offer the promise of a simple response to complex problems: the problems of violence that plague our society.
Austin Sarat

The “core crimes” of international law “violate the most central norms of humanity.”131 The global community has come to
expect individuals be held to account for their crimes, to provide justice to the victims and to society. There have been several approaches to seeking justice in the wake of atrocity. In a
number of countries, South Africa being the most well-known,
the post-conflict government has conducted truth commissions.
Some of these commissions are vested with the power to grant
amnesty for crimes committed on behalf of the state in exchange for a full accounting of those crimes.132 However, in the
seven decades since Nuremberg, the perpetrator trial has become the dominant response to atrocity, and many consider it a
fundamental requirement and method of doing justice.133
Eric Blumenson writes, “[t]o allow Pol Pot, Pinochet, and others guilty of such crimes to go unpunished is a form of legal
amnesia that appears to excuse the most egregious deeds, be131. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY
336 (2d ed. 2001).
132. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, COMMISSIONING JUSTICE: TRUTH COMMISSIONS
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 12–13 (2010). According to Amnesty International’s
report, there have been forty truth commissions established around the world
between 1974 and 2010. However, only three of these commissions (South
Africa, Grenada, and Indonesia) were constituted with the power to grant or
recommend amnesty for crimes committed under international law. Five additional commissions were given the power to grant or recommend amnesty
for crimes other than crimes under international law.
133. Lawrence Douglas, Shattering Nuremberg: Toward a Jurisprudence of
INT’L
REV.
(Nov.
21,
2007,
7:40PM),
Atrocity,
HARVARD
http://hir.harvard.edu/shattering-nuremberg.
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tray the victims who endured them, and encourage similar
crimes against others.” 134 The applicability of the traditional
trial model is complicated by the nature of the crimes and will
only be further complicated by the introduction of neuroscientific evidence. This section will discuss the theories of justice
underlying the perpetrator trial, some of the known problems
with these theories, and present a discussion of the new challenges neuroscientific evidence will bring.
At the most basic level, necessary for the fair administration
of any criminal trial, are substantive and procedural rights.
Early perpetrator trials were merely show trials, predetermined to find the accused guilty. Charles I of England, in the
first war crimes trial in a nominal court of law, was denied the
right to counsel, to present a defense, to cross-examine the witnesses against him, or to appeal the court’s decision. 135 The
twentieth century war crimes trials represent a marked departure from this first venture. The framers of the London Charter
worked hard to assure the rights of the accused at the IMT.
While the charter left many of the specific technical rules of
procedure up to the trial judges, the framers included a section
titled “Fair Trial for Defendants,” which contemplated a just,
fair, and unobjectionable process.136 The tradition has carried
through the current war crimes trials. The convening statutes
are carefully crafted, providing significant, detailed guidance
on the substantive jurisdiction of the crimes prosecuted and the
procedural rules governing the trials, including the rights of
the accused. For example, Article 21 of the convening statute of
the ICTY provides for detailed rights of the accused, while Article 25 provides for appellate process. Furthermore, unlike the
IMT, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY provide
detailed technical guidelines for the administration of the proceedings and admissibility of evidence. This is not to say all
technical aspects of proceedings before the ICTY are unambiguous.
Particularly relevant to this discussion is the ambiguity in
the precise definition of diminished or lack of mental capacity
before international criminal tribunals. This defense has only
134. Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace,
Pluralism and Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 801, 819 (2006).
135. SMITH, supra note 20, at 39.
136. London Charter, supra note 43, sec. 4, art. 16.
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been presented once before an international court, at the ICTY.
In the “Celebici Camp” trial, defendant Esad Landzo raised a
“special defense” of diminished or lack of mental responsibility.137 At the time, and still today, the definition of the legal
standard for such a defense is ambiguous. During his trial,
Landzo filed for a clarification of the precise legal parameters.138 The court determined that the defendant bore the burden of proving this defense, but reserved the definition for final
judgment.139 Ultimately, the final judgment provided little clarity on the matter, leaving open the issue of what constitutes a
“lack of capacity.”140 This decision leads to the issue of neuroscientific defenses at the ICC. Article 31(1)(a) of the Rome
Statute excludes individuals from the class of the criminally
responsible if that person “suffers from a mental disease or defect that destroys that person’s capacity to . . . control his or her
conduct to conform to the requirements of the law.”141
The “legally non-responsible/excludable” category is a socially
constructed one, heavily influenced by the moral and value
judgments of society that may vary from society to society.
Law, and particularly legal categories such as this one, is carefully constructed based on our understanding of fairness and
human behavior.142 For Greene and Cohen, neuroscience will

137. Landy F. Sparr, Mental Incapacity Defenses at the War Crimes Tribunal: Questions and Controversy, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 59, 63 (2005).
138. Id. at 64.
139. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic Delic and Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Judgment, ¶ 78 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998).
140. Sparr, supra note 137, at 64.
141. Rome Statute art. 31, sec. 1(a). The language of “destruction,” which
provides for a complete excuse from criminal responsibility, rather than diminished culpability and a mitigated prison sentence, has been said to provide a more precise definition of the requirements for a successful affirmative
defense than have other formulations of “insanity defenses,” such as the definition employed at the ICTY. That definition, as seen in the Landzo case, left
unclear whether diseases and disorders of the mind that affect control over
behavior constitute only partial defenses or complete excuse from culpability.
However, the inexactitude of psychological science and neuroscience makes it
difficult to ever ascertain whether an individual suffers from only a partial
inability to conform his or her actions to the law or a complete destruction of
that ability. As such, the framing of the affirmative psychological defense at
the ICC, and the clear implication of complete exclusion from responsibility,
may be open to more subjective interpretation than earlier definitions.
142. Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1775.
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challenge the status quo of libertarianism143 that currently underlies the law, shedding greater light on an individual’s ability
to control his or her conduct to conform to the requirements of
the law.144 As Joshua Greene writes, the “legitimacy of the law
. . . depends on its adequately reflecting the moral intuitions
and commitments of society.”145 Some neurocriminologists seek
to shed greater light on individuals’ responsibility for actions,
with the hope that their findings can better inform society’s intuitions about human behavior. International criminal tribunals, particularly the ICC, will likely be forced to determine
whether to accept the logic of neuroscience to excuse or partially excuse defendants with neurologic impairments. As courts in
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany begin and
continue to recognize a wider range of mental disorders as mitigating and legally excusing, can the ICC afford to refuse to
acknowledge these conditions and the supporting evidence?146

143. Id. at 1776. Here, the term libertarianism is not used in the political
philosophical sense. Instead, the term libertarianism in the metaphysical
philosophical sense describes an incompatibilist view that human beings are
agents with free will. Therefore, determinism is false. Greene and Cohen assert that although the current legal doctrine is officially compatibilist, meaning determinism can be true and people can be agents with free will, the law
is ultimately grounded in institutions that are philosophically libertarian. Id.
144. Id. at 1775.
145. Id. at 1778.
146. According to de Ruiter and Trestman, “[t]here is a growing uneasiness
about crime and public safety” in the Netherlands that has been accompanied
by recognition that alternative strategies are needed to address crime. The
Dutch Parliament and the Ministries of Health and Justice have called for
reports on the state of the art treatment for mentally disturbed offenders and
on the prevention and treatment of antisocial personality disorder. In part
this stems from the Dutch recognition of greater variation in the degree of
responsibility for criminal conduct. In contrast to the United States, in which
an offender is only sent to a forensic hospital if they suffer from a major psychological disorder, such as schizophrenia, a large proportion of patients in
Dutch forensic psychiatric hospitals have a personality disorder without an
accompanying major mental disorder. Clearly, the Dutch system is open to
the notion that a wide variety of disorders can diminish responsibility for
conduct. See Corine de Ruiter & Robert L. Trestman, Prevalence and Treatment of Personality Disorders in Dutch Forensic Mental Health Services, 35 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 92, 92, 94 (2007). For a discussion of the United
Kingdom, Germany, and other countries see Landy F. Sparr, Personality Disorders and Criminal Responsibility: An International Perspective, 37 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 168, 172–75 (2009).
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In all legal systems, society is forced to draw lines that hold
some individuals responsible, but not others. Even among those
that can be held criminally responsible, there are further categorical divisions. For example, the United States Supreme
Court has distinguished several classes of people for whom the
available punishments are limited, i.e., prohibiting execution of
minors and the mentally retarded, based on assumptions about
the agency and capacity of the actor.147 Implicitly, these lines
are drawn based on concepts of morality and justice, sometimes
rooted in scientific knowledge about human behavior. 148 Certainly, the bright line distinctions that society and the law create do not perfectly fit the real world. Is a person with an IQ of
71 so radically different than a person with an IQ of 69, such
that the former is eligible to be executed while the latter is not?
Is the brain of a nineteen-year-old so significantly different
from a seventeen-year-old that the former should be eligible for
execution, while the latter should not?
The distinctions that law makes are also not universal. The
minimum age at which an individual can be held criminally
responsible varies by country and in some instances within a
country. For example, in the United States, the youngest minimum age at which any state holds a child legally responsible is
six, while the highest minimum age in any state is twelve. In
the United Kingdom, whose legal system provides much of the
foundation of the U.S. legal system, the minimum age is ten.
Do the United Kingdom and other nations (or other states, in
the case of the United States) that hold a child under twelve
responsible commit a moral wrong by doing so?
It is unrealistic to expect science to provide us with simple
answers to these complex questions. Even when science can
shed light on issues, how far will the law go in response to science? History would suggest that even with scientific evidence,
the law is only willing to go so far to recognize new information. For example, neuroscience has provided U.S. courts
with some information on juvenile brains and their responsibility for actions. However, the courts have not said that a juve147. See supra notes 103–114 and accompanying text.
148. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572–73 (2005) and Graham v.
Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2026–27 (2010), in which the Supreme Court, relying
on psychological and neuroscientific evidence, determined that juveniles
lacked the requisite agency to be responsible for particular crimes to the extent that would justify execution or life without parole.
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nile should be completely excused for his or her actions based
on brain development. Instead, the courts have simply limited
the permanence of the penal response to juvenile deviance.149
Similarly, neuroscience may provide us with information from
which to draw distinctions between who is and is not culpable,
but the law may choose not to fully exculpate these individuals,
but rather tailor the punishment as has been done with juveniles.
Thus, a refusal to include particular conditions in the category of legally exculpatory, even when inclusion is supported by
neuroscientific evidence, is not necessarily an indictment of the
system. Exclusion does not prove that the trials are unfair or
are simply show trials. However, if the relevant disciplinary
groups begin to treat the science as valid, a total denial of the
defendant’s right to present a neuroscientific defense is likely
to bring at least some scrutiny to the motivations for rejecting
science. Some will likely see the decision as the result of a value-laden judgment that these individuals are inexcusable, regardless of their ability to conform their actions to the law. Society is likely willing to accept this rejection.
If the rights of the accused and the victim are balanced, very
few are likely to complain that the scale has tipped in favor of
the victim. However, if the courts deny defendants the right to
present an exculpating defense, and perhaps the only viable
defense available in some instances, because of a value judgment, the courts would be undermining what the framers of
international criminal tribunals have worked hard to do: establish legitimate trials for those accused of even the most heinous
crimes. 150 The rejection would also go against the establishment of the insanity defense that is available in so many domestic legal systems.151 For many of these defendants, as with
many of the defendants who employ an insanity defense in domestic criminal trials, the affirmative defense based on neuroscience would be the only defense. A complete rejection, excluding neuroscience, may reveal that the purpose of these trials is
149. See supra notes 103–114 and accompanying text.
150. See supra Part II and Part IV for a discussion of the development of
principles of fairness and legitimacy in International Criminal Trials beginning with Nuremberg.
151. See, e.g., RITA JAMES SIMON & HEATHER AHN-REDDING, THE INSANITY
DEFENSE, THE WORLD OVER (2006) for a discussion of the insanity defense in
countries around the world.
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to find the defendant guilty of the act as a symbol of recognizing the wrong and standing with the victims, regardless of biological responsibility for the conduct. This choice does not necessarily spell the end of the international criminal trial, or
make these trials pure show trials. Perhaps, a rejection simply
reinforces the notion that trying to fit ordinary legal procedures
to extraordinary crimes is imperfect. It may suggest that what
is just, even what procedures are just, is so contextual that the
language of ordinary law is simply inapplicable to the international criminal trial.
On a deeper level, neuroscience presents significant challenges for the current theories of justice and punishment that underlie bringing perpetrators before a criminal tribunal. Ordinary domestic criminal law subjects the guilty offender to penal
sanctions justified by rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence, both specific and general.152 While the rationality of ordinary law has been borrowed in support of the extraordinary
perpetrator trial, reformation and rehabilitation play almost no
part in the extant literature on supranational punishment.153
Instead, international law theorists focus on deterrence and
retribution. 154 Deterrence is premised on the notion that the
individual is a rational actor who will engage in a cost-benefit
analysis, weighing the potential for success in his criminal act
against the possibility of criminal prosecution and punitive
sanction.155 As Jeremy Bentham wrote, “[p]unishment must be
the object of dread more than the offense is an object of desire.”156 However, the deterrent effect of international criminal
prosecutions is perhaps more dubious than the deterrent effect
of even the harshest domestic criminal sanctions.
The IMT prosecuted the Nazis for their atrocities nearly seventy years ago and concluded with several defendants receiving

152. For more discussion of the theoretical justifications of criminal sanctions, see, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2021–23 (2010); HERBERT
L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35–52 (1968); Douglas, supra note 133; Farooq Hassan, The Theoretical Basis of Punishment in International Criminal Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 39 (1983).
153. Douglas, supra note 133.
154. DRUMBL, supra note 153, at 11.
155. Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just
Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 284,
285 (2002).
156. Hassan, supra note 152, at 49.
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the ultimate sanction—death.157 Yet, in the intervening seven
decades, there have been heinous crimes committed by state
actors around the world. Criminal prosecutions have followed
the cessation of hostilities in many of these instances, yet there
continue to be state-sanctioned atrocities. Perhaps the deterrent effect is diminished by the relatively light sentences meted
out before some criminal tribunals.158 The mean sentence as of
May 2006 at the ICTY was 14.3 years and the mean sentences
of the Special Panels for East Timor was 9.9 years.159 Further
diminishing the effect of these light sentences, each of these
tribunals has granted several individuals early release.160
Neuroscience further challenges the deterrent effect of international criminal prosecutions. If human behavior is in some
way predetermined by brain biochemistry or structure, preventing the deviant behavior from occurring through the punishment of others is unlikely to be successful. Admittedly, there
are very few, if any, neuroscientists and neurocriminologists
who adopt a purely deterministic approach to human behavior.
However, even under theories of moderate determinism, the
deterrent effect of punishment is likely to be significantly diminished.
A fundamental requirement for deterrence to be successful is
the assumption that the perpetrators are rational actors. However, when dealing with war criminals at the highest level of
power, that assumption may become specious. Psychological
assessments suggest that some of the infamously “evil” heads

157. Twelve of the Nuremberg defendants were sentenced to death, including Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hans Frank, Alfred Rosenberg, Julius Streicher,
Martin Bormann, Wilhelm Frick, Herman Göring, Alfred Jodl, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Wilhelm Keitel, Fritz Sauckel, and Arthur Seyss-Inquart. Göring
avoided hanging by committing suicide the night before his execution.
158. Certainly, the view that these sentences are lenient or inordinately
light is context dependent. From an American perspective, these sentences
may be seen as extremely light. Maximum sentences are far shorter in many
European countries. Perhaps, from a different cultural perspective these sentences are not unusual. For example, in the Netherlands, there is no capital
punishment and non-life sentences are limited to thirty years for murder and
to fifteen years for manslaughter. For further discussion of homicide sentencing in the Netherlands, see Brian D. Johnson et al., Sentencing Homicide
Offenders in the Netherlands: Offender, Victim, and Situational Influences in
Criminal Punishment, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 981 (2010).
159. DRUMBL, supra note 153, at 11, 56.
160. Id. at 57–58.
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of state possessed significant psychological disorders. 161 In
2007, psychologists Frederick Coolidge and Daniel Segal asked
five experts to evaluate Hitler according to the DSM-IV (the
fourth edition of the DSM). The experts claimed that Hitler
scored highly on the personality disorder scales for paranoia,
antisocial behavior, narcissism, and sadism.162 The experts also
believed that Hitler likely had schizophrenic tendencies.163 Coolidge and Segal pursued their interest in exploring the psychological disorders of dictators, evaluating Saddam Hussein
based on informant reports from eleven Iraqis who knew Hussein either personally or through family connections for an average of twenty-four years.164 They claimed that Hussein, like
Hitler, exhibited clear symptoms of paranoia, antisocial behavior, narcissism, and sadism.165 Two years later, Coolidge and
Segal endeavored to diagnose Kim Jong-il.166 According to their
analysis, Coolidge and Segal claimed that Kim Jong-il exhibited the same “big six” constellation of personality disorders.167
Coolidge and Segal believe that these six personality disorders
may commonly reflect the personality of dictators generally.168
Whatever deterrent role prosecution and punishment plays,
“retribution is the dominant stated objective” of the perpetrator
trial.169 In administering and justifying the level and means of
any punishment in response to criminal wrongdoing, society is
forced to walk the fine line between retribution and revenge.
The existence of a meaningful distinction between the two concepts in criminal law is heavily debated; however, retribution,
unlike revenge, is grounded in the idea of “just deserts,” giving
161. See Frederick L. Coolidge & Daniel L. Segal, Was Saddam Hussein
Like Adolf Hitler: A Personality Disorder Investigation, 19 MILITARY PSYCHOL.
289, 290 (2007).
162. Id. at 290.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 291.
165. Id. at 293–94.
166. Frederick L. Coolidge & Daniel L. Segal, Is Kim Jong-il Like Saddam
Hussein and Adolf Hitler? A Personality Disorder Evaluation, 1 BEHAV. SCI.
TERRORISM & POL. AGGRESSION 195, 195 (2009).
167. Id. at 199.
168. Jason G. Goldman, The Psychology of Dictatorship: Kim Jong-il,
AMERICAN
(Dec.
19,
2011),
SCIENTIFIC
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/thoughtful-animal/2011/12/19/thepsychology-of-dictatorship-kim-jong-il/.
169. DRUMBL, supra note 153, at 150.
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people what they deserve for past actions.170 The difficulty for
retribution in the prosecution of war crimes, however, is that
the acts of those brought to trial are so heinous that no available punishment can give these offenders what they deserve.171
As Hannah Arendt wrote, “[f]or these crimes, no punishment is
severe enough. It may well be essential to hang Göring, but it
is totally inadequate. That is, this guilt, in contrast to all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems.”172
The limited severity of the sanctions available to the ICC and
other international criminal tribunals further strains the ability to achieve retribution for war crimes. In contrast to the
United States and the eighteen other nations currently employing capital punishment, the maximum sanction available to the
ICC is life in prison.173 In addition to the inability to administer
a punishment fitting the crime, retributivism suffers from being offender-centric.174 In administering punishment based on
retributivist theory, justice to the victim is a “mere by-product
of . . . the punishment that is required to treat the offender as
she deserves.” 175 In fact, several studies have convincingly
shown that survivors of atrocity have a strong preference for
justice through truth telling.176 This seemingly undermines at
least one of the justifications for the international criminal trial, which is to bring about justice for the victims and their families.177
Setting aside, for the moment, these widely contested issues
of the success of retributivism in war crimes trials, neurosci170. Leo Zaibert, Punishment and Revenge, 25 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 81
(2006).
171. Douglas, supra note 133.
172. GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 13 (2000).
173. DRUMBL, supra note 153, at 52.
174. Retributivism concerns itself only with what the defendant deserves,
rather than focusing on what the victim desires. VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF
HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 71 (2011).
175. Blumenson, supra note 134, at 836. Taking this conclusion one step
further, the trial process itself often treats victims simply as a means to convict the defendant.
176. David Mendeloff, Trauma and Vengeance: Assessing the Psychological
and Emotional Effects of Post-Conflict Justice, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 592, 594–95
(2009).
177. Douglas, supra note 30, at 514, 520. See also, WILLIAM SCHABAS &
NADIA BERNAZ, ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 408
(2011).
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ence further complicates the ability to justify punishment
through retribution. As Stephen Morse points out, the law currently requires only minimal rationality, for example, the ability to tell right from wrong, to be legally responsible and deserving of punishment.178 For Morse, neuroscientific discoveries
thus far do not pose problems for the law’s ability to hold individuals responsible.179 Nor does Morse think it is likely we will
discover anything soon that would materially challenge the
law.180 However, as Joshua Greene writes, “our operative legal
principles exist because they more or less adequately capture
an intuitive sense of justice.” 181 While Greene concedes that
Morse is correct as the law stands, Greene and others believe
that neuroscience will challenge and reshape our sense of justice, posing problems for retributivist justifications for punishment in the future.182 In part, Greene contends that punishment based in retributivism relies on a demanding concept of
free will, rather than a minimal rationality. 183 If behavior is
determined based on brain biochemistry or structure, then arguably we lack the requisite free will to meet the current
standards of responsibility necessary for retributivism.184 Peter
Conrad reaches the same conclusion, though he reaches that
conclusion through a different path. He writes that if deviance
is characterized as “badness,” deviants are considered responsible for their behavior.185 Once deviance is placed in the realm
of “sickness,” the deviant is no longer responsible for his or her
actions and instead is deserving of treatment, rather than punishment.186 These notions create a number of problems. If the
court rejects neuroscience, the defendant’s procedural rights
may be abrogated.187 But, has the court also stepped from retribution into the realm of revenge? How can the court justify
178. Morse, supra note 5, at 6–7; Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old
Problems: Legal Implications of Brain Science, 6 CEREBRUM 81 (2004), available at http://dana.org/news/cerebrum/detail.aspx?id=1204.
179. Morse, supra note 5, at 2.
180. Id. at 3.
181. Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1775.
182. Id. at 1776.
183. Id. at 1775.
184. Id.
185. CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra note 61, at 34.
186. Id.
187. One could argue that failure to allow the defense to mount a legitimate
defense constitutes an abrogation of procedural due process and fairness.
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punishing offenders in the face of neuroscientific evidence
demonstrating diminished free will?
The court may be able to legitimately move beyond the unwillingness to completely excuse war criminals, but any legitimacy maintained in the guilt phase of the trial may, for the
staunchest of retributivists, be erased by a vengeful punishment.188 If the ICC ignores scientific information demonstrating a diminished ability to control one’s actions and continues
to punish as it and other international tribunals have, it departs from engaging in retributivism. Whether continuing
these punishments in opposition to science enters the realm of
revenge is, at least in part, dependent on the extent to which
neuroscience actually reshapes our moral intuitions and the
extent to which there is another reasonable, sustainable justification for continuing the status quo punishment, such as expressivism or lustration.189
Desert and moral judgment do not exist in a vacuum. As with
the substantive construction of the legally excludable, the notion of just deserts is socially constructed. When people draw
moral distinctions between those deserving of blame and punishment and those who are excused, they do so not in abstraction but in context. State-sponsored atrocity is extraordinary.
Finding a punishment that matches the horror done by genocidal war criminals is impossible. Perhaps, because of the extraordinary crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, society
will continue to believe these individuals are deserving of punishment, regardless of biological culpability. Even if one were
to concede that this no longer fits in the realm of retributivism
because of a divide in the law and collective morality, there
seem to be perfectly acceptable justifications for continuing to
punish these offenders as the courts have, without entering the
realm of revenge.
188. Lawrence Douglas, The Saddam Hussein Hanging: A Spectacle of
Vengeance, JURIST (Jan. 4, 2007), http://jurist.org/forumy/2007/01/saddamhussein-hanging-spectacle-of.php.
189. Expressivism holds that enforcing punishments on individuals for
their wrongdoing is a way of expressing disapproval for the behavior being
punished. See Bill Wringe, Why Punish War Crimes? Victor’s Justice and Expressive Justifications of Punishment, 25 L. AND PHIL. 159, 177–78 (2006).
Lustration is the act of purging or cleansing, similar to expulsion. Under this
justification, punishment is justified in its cleansing society of the wrongdoer.
Douglas, supra note 188.
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Greene may be correct that neuroscience will reshape our collective moral intuitions, necessitating changes in law, but his
hypothesis may also be incomplete. Based on the decades of
scholarship on war crimes trials, it is clear that the overriding
sentiment is that these individuals deserve to suffer the worst
possible fates for their crimes, no matter what. It seems unlikely to change society’s desire to continue to force these individuals to suffer the consequences of their actions, regardless of
whether they could “conform their actions” to the law. As Professor Lawrence Douglas writes, it may be possible to oppose
the death penalty or other harsh punishment while endorsing
its use for perpetrators of genocide, suggesting the moral difference between punishing ordinary criminals and extraordinary criminals.190 Douglas contends that Arendt’s justification
for Eichmann’s execution is the best orchestration of this point.
In addressing the appropriateness of the death penalty for
Eichmann, Arendt provides a reasoned justification for punishment: lustration. 191 She wrote in reference to Eichmann,
“just as you supported and carried out a policy of not wanting
to share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a
number of other nationals we find that no one, that is, no
member of the human race, can be expected to want to share
the earth with you.” 192 Revenge, Nozick contends, is personal.193 In contrast, the agent of retribution need have no special
tie to the wrong done. 194 Thus, Arendt’s reasoned judgment
skirts the realm of revenge, justifying Eichmann’s execution
not in the name of the Jewish people or any other specific
group, but in the name of humanity as a whole.195 Expressivism
is a viable alternative to retributivism, particularly as it ties in
with the inherently didactic nature of criminal trials.196 However, justifying harsh punishment based on expressivism may
be more difficult than justification based on lustration.

190. Douglas, supra note 133.
191. Id.
192. ARENDT, supra note 7, at 279.
193. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 367 (1981).
194. Id.
195. Douglas, supra note 133.
196. Mark Drumbl, The Expressive Value of Prosecuting and Punishing Terrorists: Hamdan, The Geneva Convention and International Criminal Law,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165 (2011).
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Expressivism, an infrequently cited third alternative to retributivist and deterrent notions of punishment, relies on the
principle that the trials and the act of punishing serve as a
symbolic, declarative act associated with the pedagogical purpose of trials.197 The act of punishing communicates messages
about power, authority, legitimacy, and normality.198 Most importantly, punishment demonstrates society’s disapproval for
the particular behavior and reinvigorates society’s faith in the
law. 199 However, proponents of expressivism face significant
challenges. First, if this is the appropriate justification for punishing war crimes, how can we reject neuroscientific evidence?
Otherwise stated, how can we justify inflicting harsh levels of
punishment, particularly in the face of neuroscientific evidence
claiming to demonstrate diminished culpability, if the mere act
of punishment is sufficient to communicate society’s disapproval for conduct? Wringe responds to these potential objections in
two ways. First, he states that the denunciation of the crime
must be one that is “clearly sincere.”200 If the criminal is allowed to escape with mere public denunciation or some other
light punishment, the sincerity of the expression of disapproval
might be questioned, especially if that denunciation was coupled with a displacement of blame. 201 Second, he notes that
considerations of proportionality are central to the fairness of
any system.202 War crimes are frequently considered the most
serious crimes.203 Thus, a system of punishment that allowed
war criminals to be tried but not punished would involve violations of proportionality, particularly given that it is unlikely
that society would allow all disordered offenders an exemption
from responsibility for their crimes.204
The ICC will face difficult choices in an effort to “do justice”
in the face of growing knowledge about the human brain. Regardless of the court’s decision to accept or reject evidence that
197. Douglas, supra note 30, at 514; see also, DRUMBL, supra note 153, at
17.
198. See DRUMBL, supra note 153, at 12.
199. Id.
200. Wringe, supra note 189, at 180.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 185.
203. WILLIAM SCHABAS, WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON THE
DEATH PENALTY, JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 659 (2008).
204. Id.
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behavior is in some part determined by brain structure and
function, not all parties will be satisfied. Perhaps we have
reached a point in time when the traditional criminal trial
model is difficult to justify and maintain. As Justice Stone, in
reference to Nuremberg, wrote,
[i]t would not disturb me greatly . . . if that power were openly
and frankly used to punish the German leaders for being a
bad lot, but it disturbs me some to have it dressed up in the
habiliments of the common law and the Constitutional safeguards to those charged with crime.205

VII. MAKING HISTORY IN THE COURTROOM
Anthony D’Amato has suggested that war crimes trials can
be “one of the most fundamental lessons in civics that can be
taught.” 206 Gideon Hausner, in his memoir, wrote that he
“wanted the trial to capture the imagination of Israelis, among
others, and give them a personal sense of what had happened.” 207 Hausner is not alone in his quest for achieving a
pedagogical purpose to conducting a war crimes trial. In fact,
the great perpetrator trials of the last 100 years all aimed to do
something more than render legal justice. Each of them explicitly embraced a didactic purpose.208 In perhaps their most important role, as history teller, these trials aim to provide justice, for not only the victims and the perpetrators, as expected
in ordinary criminal trials, but also for history.209 Perpetrator
trials provide an opportunity to narrate events publicly to disseminate information about acts often cloaked in government
secrecy.210 In openly addressing the atrocity, these trials have
the power to “resuscitate[] history and [make] it into a current
event,” creating a record that will withstand the test of time.211
205. BASS, supra note 172, at 25.
206. Gerry J. Simpson, Didactic and Dissident Histories in War Crimes Trials, 60 ALB. L. REV. 801, 824–25 (1997).
207. DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, THE EICHMANN TRIAL 55 (2011).
208. Douglas, supra note 30, at 514. The court in the Eichmann trial wrote
of “the great educational value implicit in the very holding of this trial.” Robert Kempner, a junior prosecutor at Nuremberg, called the trials “the greatest history seminar ever held in the history of the world.” Attorney-General of
the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 ILR 5 (Israel District Court 1961).
209. Douglas, supra note 30, at 514.
210. DRUMBL, supra note 153, at 17.
211. Simpson, supra note 206, at 824.
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These trials have attempted to accomplish their didactic goal
in a variety of ways. The Nuremberg trials used extensive video recordings and documents, created by the Nazis, to tell the
story of the atrocities of the Holocaust.212 The Eichmann trial
relied heavily on the victim-witness.213 Survivors told their stories in narrative form to form the evidence against Eichmann.
Other trials have involved a mix of victim survivors and documentary evidence. 214 The histories these trials tell, however,
are not all encompassing. The historical narrative of these trials is filtered through a legal lens confined by the rules of evidence and procedure.215 Gerry Simpson notes, “problems occur
when art, history and law begin to encroach on each other’s
territory.”216 These problems are only heightened when science
enters the mix.
Since 1946, advances in technology have vastly transformed
the speed at which information is disseminated. The rapid diffusion of pictures, video, and written accounts has made global
events less opaque. Individuals from Seattle to London to Tokyo were able to follow the progress of the battle between the
Libyan Rebels and Qaddafi’s forces live from the comfort of
their living rooms. Major network news reporters Anderson
Cooper and Christiane Amanpour have broadcast in real-time
from some of the most war-torn regions, including Iraq, Somalia and Rwanda. No longer will people in the first-world be
completely in the dark about atrocities happening in far away
parts of the globe. Yet, the didactic purpose of these trials is
not diminished by the ease of information access.
In an age in which a person could experience sensory overload from the images and sounds bombarding them from the
nightly news, the didactic purpose is as important now as it
was seventy-five years ago. In addition to the challenges with
rendering justice, for both the accused and the victim, neuroscience presents a significant challenge to the court’s ability to
render justice for history. The admission of neuroscientific evidence would significantly detract from the ability to tell a last212. Douglas, supra note 30, at 515.
213. Id.
214. See Timothy K. Kuhner, The Status of Victims in Enforcement of International Criminal Law, 6 OR. REV. INT’L L. 95 (2004) for a discussion of the
growing and evolving role of the victim in international criminal trials.
215. Douglas, supra note 30, at 515–16.
216. Simpson, supra note 206, at 825.
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ing story about the events of the atrocity and the strength of
the survivors and convey messages about responsibility and
morality, instead focusing the trial on science. Peter Conrad
writes that the dark side of medicalizing deviant behavior includes the dominance of experts, the dislocation of responsibility, and the exclusion of evil.217 These issues are particularly
troubling for the perpetrator trial, given the importance of the
didactic purpose. One of the fundamental questions that the
court will need to answer in determining whether to allow neuroscientific defenses becomes, “What story do we want these
trials to tell?”
Lawrence Douglas points out that these trials cannot control
the way in which they become cultural artifacts.218 While this is
certainly true, the court does have control over the choices that
cumulatively could affect a trial’s place in history. Allowing
complex neuroscientific evidence may capture the narrative of
the trial, shifting the focus from a story of responsibility and
morality to a story about science. To mount a defense based on
highly technical, scientific evidence, the defense needs to present testimony or documents from at least one expert who has
evaluated the defendant. The prosecution is sure to want its
own expert to evaluate the defendant, who will likely come to a
different conclusion regarding the defendant’s mental and neurological status. As happens in many domestic trials relying on
highly technical or scientific evidence, the trial becomes a “battle of experts.”219 Allowing this to happen is sure to shape the
trials’ place in history.
War crimes trials have already experienced problems related
to the assertion of a psychological affirmative defense. In 1998,
Esad Landzo raised a special defense in the Celebici Camp trial. 220 Five psychiatrists evaluated Landzo. The four psychiatrists called by the defense, including two initially appointed by
the court, concluded that Landzo suffered from psychiatric con217. CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra note 61, at 259.
218. Douglas, supra note 30, at 521.
219. The Casey Anthony trial, which relied significantly on highly technical
and scientific evidence, is a prime example of a trial that turned into a battle
of experts. See, e.g., Mike Schneider, Casey Anthony Trial; ‘Battle of Experts,’
PRESS
(May
23,
2011),
ASSOCIATED
http://www.wptv.com/dpp/news/state/casey-anthony-trial%3A-’battle-ofexperts’.
220. Sparr, supra note 137, at 59.
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ditions that impaired his ability to control his behavior. 221
However, the experts came to different conclusions about what
psychiatric condition Landzo suffered from.222 Dr. Landy Sparr
testified for the prosecution and concluded that the personality
abnormalities Landzo possessed were simply personality traits
that had no pathological origin.223 Because of the lack of consensus, the defense tried several strategies based on Landzo’s
supposed diminished mental capacity. 224 Early evaluations of
the defendant suggested he suffered from Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (“PTSD”).225 Defense counsel initially proceeded with their defense based on this theory. When it became
clear the PTSD defense would prove unsuccessful, the defense
shifted its strategy.226 Several subsequent psychiatric evaluations of Landzo revealed a constellation of symptoms, including
narcissism, antisocial behavior, “schizoid, compliant, borderline, inadequate, immature, impulsive, unstable, and deprived”
personality traits.227 The defense blamed his criminal conduct
on this more generalized theory of “personality disorder.” Landzo was eventually convicted and sentenced to fifteen years in
prison. In its judgment, the court acknowledged the psychiatrists’ opinions and noted that it took into account Landzo’s age
and mental condition in deciding his sentence.228 In presenting
such a complex defense, the defense arguably distracted from
the important narrative these trials can offer. Instead of a morality play, the Landzo trial is written about and remembered
for its battle of psychiatric experts and “spaghetti thrown on
the wall” style defense. Additionally, as Conrad notes, by defining a behavior in medical terms, the problem is removed from
the public realm where discussion can occur among lay individuals and put on a plane where only medical individuals can

221. Id. at 64.
222. Id.
223. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic Delic and Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Judgment, ¶ 1180 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16,
1998).
224. Sparr, supra note 137, at 64.
225. Id. at 63.
226. Dr. Van Leeuwen testified that Landzo did not suffer from a posttraumatic stress disorder at the time the crimes were committed, undermining the defense PTSD theory. Delalic, Mucic Delic and Landzo, at ¶ 1184.
227. Sparr, supra note 137, at 64.
228. Delalic, Mucic Delic and Landzo, at ¶ 1283.
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discuss it.229 How can lay individuals discuss the fairness of the
outcome of the Landzo trial, or its legacy, without a medical
professional’s understanding of his mental condition?
While affixing responsibility is always a complex process,
medicalization heightens the confusion and ambiguity. 230 To
begin with, determining and defining an individual’s responsibility is more difficult in war crimes trials. Unlike an “ordinary” crime, mass atrocity cannot occur without the cooperation of numerous individuals. Preliminarily determining the
nature of an individual’s role in the atrocity in an effort to assess the appropriate criminal charges is certainly a difficulty
that stems from the collective nature of atrocity. However,
structuring a trial that situates the individual in the overall
narrative of atrocity is an important task for the perpetrator
trial. The difficulty for modern war crimes trials, unlike Nuremberg, is that we rarely see twenty-four defendants in the
dock at once. Yet, these trials, even with only one defendant,
strive to provide a narrative that is bigger than the individual
perpetrator on trial. Pathologizing deviant behavior distracts
from the ability to create a larger narrative. Medicalizing deviance makes the criminal conduct the product of individual disorder or illness. Doing so ignores the important role of society
and collective action in atrocity and focuses the narrative on
the single individual without contextualizing his or her role in
the atrocity. As one commentator writes,
Hitler orchestrated the greatest mass genocide in modern history, yet some have reduced his motivation for the destruction
of the Jews (and others) to a personal pathological condition.
To them and to many of us, Hitler was sick. But this portrays
the horror of the Holocaust as a product of individual pathology.231

Efforts to understand the motivations of these war criminals as
the product of sickness “prevents us from seeing and confronting man’s inhumanity to man.”232 The perpetrator trial teaches
a lesson in responsibility and accountability, and reaffirms the
rule of law. It has served as a warning that heads of state are
not exempt from the rule of law. The trial process also creates a
229.
230.
231.
232.

CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra note 61, at 249.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 251.
Id.
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clear narrative that distinguishes victim from perpetrator.
Pathologizing deviance threatens to cloud this narrative by
creating a multiplication of victims.
Pathologizing deviance blurs the clearly defined “victim” and
“perpetrator” and in doing so undermines the narrative of responsibility and morality, in some ways devaluing the victims’
experiences. Instead, understanding deviance as a product of
biology or psychopathology creates multiple classes of victims.
While we maintain a traditional class of victims that have been
wronged in the course of atrocity, we create a new class: perpetrators that are victims of circumstance or biology. In multiplying classes of victims, the trial would become handicapped in
its narrative power. The trial would be unable to tell a story of
responsibility, as blame simply shifts until no one can be held
accountable.
Finally, pathologizing criminal conduct leads to an exclusion
of evil from discussions of atrocity. “Medicalization . . . shrouds
conditions, events, and people and prevents them from being
confronted as evil.” 233 According to Conrad and Schneider,
there is little to be gained from thinking about people like
Qaddafi as sick.234 A medical framework impedes our ability to
comprehend “the human element in the decisions we make, the
social structures we create, and the actions we take.”235 As we
have seen from criticism of Arendt’s concept of “the banality of
evil,” the characterization of Eichmann as seemingly normal
was and is to this day discomforting to outsiders for more reasons than just the arguable inaccuracy of the claim.236 Biologizing behavior produces much the same result as characterizing
Eichmann as banal. Doing so eradicates the concept of evil, and
eliminates the inherent sense of otherness of perpetrators of
atrocity. While the “us” and “them” attitude is invariably one of
the things that led to the Holocaust and other acts of atrocity,
it is also what allows us to deal with the historical legacy of
233. Id.
234. Id. at 251–52.
235. Id. at 252.
236. As discussed in note 7, supra, famed Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg
has criticized Arendt for her characterization of Eichmann’s evil as “banal”
and for explanation of the mechanisms of the Nazi’s evil acts. See, e.g., BEREL
LANG, HOLOCAUST REPRESENTATION: ART WITHIN THE LIMITS OF HISTORY AND
ETHICS 100–04 (2000) for a discussion of Hilberg’s assertions discussed in his
work RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (1981).
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these acts. If we view those that perpetrate acts of violence as
significantly different from ourselves, then we can believe that
we would never engage in the same conduct. However, if deviant behavior is the result of biology or pathology, it may be the
result of nothing more than a genetic roll of the dice. If so,
there is a possibility that any one of us could have been afflicted by the same “illness” and put in the same position as these
individuals we would otherwise like to characterize as “monsters.”
CONCLUSION
The twenty-first century has seen a resurgence in research
on the biological theories of deviant behavior. Researchers are
working to understand both the genetic and neurological factors contributing to criminal conduct. As the science continues
to develop, the legal community has shown a growing interest
in incorporating scientific evidence of biological correlates of
criminality into criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court of
the United States has referenced studies on the neurological
development of adolescents in support of barring life without
parole for non-homicide crimes. Several state trial courts have
heard expert evidence describing individual defendant’s neurologic deficits in the sentencing phase of capital cases. With
these theories about deviant behavior comes a possible change
in our conception of individual criminal culpability.
Neuroscientific evidence poses significant challenges for trials before the ICC. First, the court must manage a delicate balance between a defendant’s due process rights against the
rights of the victim’s to see justice. Neuroscientific evidence,
demonstrating diminished free will and culpability, complicates
this balancing act. To reject the science and deny the defendant
the right to present an exculpatory defense, the court would
undermine what the framers of perpetrator trials have worked
so hard to do since Nuremberg, essentially, to provide a fair
forum for holding perpetrators accountable for their actions.
Yet, if the court accepts the evidence and excuses the defendant
based on his or her neurologic deficiencies, the court undermines the purpose of holding individual heads of state and
high-level state officials accountable for their conduct. In the
language we currently use to discuss these trials, since they
are similar to their ordinary domestic counterparts, it is difficult to see how an outright denial of the right to present a neu-
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roscience-based defense does not make these trials show trials.
However, even if Joshua Greene is right that the legitimacy of
law will be undermined as societal morals change based on
evolving understandings of free will and culpability, his hypothesis may be incomplete. Contrary to the literature on these
trials, war crimes trials may be so radically different from ordinary criminal trials that society may not change its perspective on the morality of holding war criminals accountable.
Second, neuroscience presents challenges for our current theories of justice and punishment that underlie bringing perpetrators before a criminal tribunal. Criminal law subjects guilty
offenders to penal sanctions in order to achieve rehabilitation,
retribution, and deterrence. Rehabilitation plays no role in the
literature on war crimes trials. However, both retribution and
deterrence hold significant places in the discussion of punishing these offenders. If an individual lacks the ability to conform
his or her behavior to the law because of specific pathology, the
individual is unlikely to be able to engage in the calculus required for deterrence to be successful. The individual probably
will not weigh the likelihood of prosecution and punishment
against the perceived benefit from engaging in the conduct.
Additionally, if the conduct were the product of sickness or pathology, common sense would suggest the individual is not deserving of punishment, at least in ordinary circumstances.
However, to let these individuals go without punishment seems
reprehensible on its face. As commentators have noted, to let
individuals like Pol Pot and Pinochet roam free is to be complicit in their behavior. However, this does not mean we cannot
continue to punish. Perhaps we simply need to reframe the discussions of punishment, justifying incarceration of war criminals on the symbolic value and the expressive function of punishment.
Finally, the didactic purpose of these trials, which is key to
their success, is threatened by allowing complex neuroscientific
evidence. These trials must do justice not only to the perpetrators and the victims, but also to history. These trials serve to
create a body of evidence that serves as a record for future generations. They tell a story of how the victims were wronged and
how society is willing to hold high-ranking individuals accountable for their conduct. Allowing neuroscience-based defenses would distract from a narrative of responsibility and a
reaffirmation of the rule of law. Instead it will create a battle of
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experts, the displacement of responsibility, and the exclusion of
evil.
Perhaps it is time to reassess the way we frame the purpose
and justification of the great perpetrator trials. These trials can
continue to serve society; however, it seems untenable to continue with the status quo in the face of evolving science. It is
clear that regardless of how the court handles the situation, the
admissibility of the evidence and the excusability of individuals
with psychopathologies, the court faces significant challenges
in the future.

